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Sept. 25, 1953.]

Estate of SALLIE LEFTWICH DUKE, Deceased. HARRY
G. LOGAN, Appellant, v. JESS 0. SHELBY, JR., as
Executor, et al., Respondents.
[1] Wills-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-Policy of
law which underlies Prob. Code, § 70, relating to revocation
of will by subsequent marriage of testator unless provision is
made for spouse, is social disfavor toward testator's failure to
provide for surviving spouse.
[2] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-The law presumes that subsequent marriage of testator has wrought such
a change in his condition in life as to cause him to destroy
or cancel a previous will, and does not admit of evidence to
contrary unless provision has been made according to law for
wife and children who have survived him.
[3] !d.-Revocation-Change in Circumstances.-At common law,
revocation of a will because of subsequent change in domestic
relations of testator was based on his implied intention.
[4] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-In California,
common-law doctrine of implied revocation has been replaced
by statutory presumption of revocation which operates on
showing that spouse married testator after making of will
and survived maker; these things being shown, the will is revoked as to spouse regardless of wishes of deceased unless
testamentary document includes provision for spouse by marriage contract, provision for spouse in the will, or mention of
spouse therein in such way as to show intention to make such
provision. (Prob. Code, § 70.)
[5] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-Although a
testator need not make provision for a future spouse, he is
required to bear in mind the possibility of a subsequent marriage and serious changes in domestic relations resulting therefrom.
l6] Id.- Revocation- Marriage After Making WilL-Although
broad enough to include a spouse, exclusionary clauses in a will
which fail to indicate that testator contemplated the possibility
of a later marriage are insufficient to avoid revocation of will.
[7] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making Will.-Clause in
will whereby testatrix has excluded "any person or persons
[1] Marriage as revoking will, note, 92 A.L.R. 1010. See, also,
Cal.Jur., Wills, § 151; Am.Jur., Wills, § 526.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4, 5] Wills, § 257; [3) Wills, § 256;
[6-8] Wills, § 260; [9] Wills, § 560; [10] Wills, § 548.

510

EsTATE oF DuKE

[41 C.2d

who may, after the date of this will, become my heir or heirs
by reason of marriage or otherwise" clearly states an intention
not to provide for a class of persons which necessarily would
include a future spouse.
[8] Id.- Revocation- Marriage After Making WilL-Although
extrinsic evidence may be received to resolve an ambiguity
resulting from uncertain language appearing in a will (Prob.
Code, § 105), where no uncertainty appears in terms of will
by which a future spouse is excluded, extrinsic evidence concerning testatrix' intention in this regard should not be received.
[9] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Evidence.-Although extrinsic evidence concerning testatrix' intention with
regard to future spouse was improperly received in absence of
any uncertainty in terms of will excluding such spouse, no
prejudice resulted to either party where such evidence merely
tended to support correct legal conclusion of trial court concerning effect of will.
[10] !d.-Appeal-Orders Appealable.-No appeal lies from an
order refusing to vacate a judgment predicated on an order
denying petition to revoke probate of a will, and a purported
appeal therefrom will he dismissed. (Prob. Code, § 1240.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County predicated on order denying petition to revoke
probate of a will, and from an order denying a motion to
vacate the judgment. Dean Sherry, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal from order dismissed.
David H. Thompson, Riley & Ferguson and John M. Riley
for Appellant.
Russell G. Taliaferro for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-The petition of Harry G. Logan to revoke
the probate of the will of Sallie l.J. l.Jogan, his deceased wife,
was denied. The appeal from the judgment subsequently
entered requires a construction of the will in connection with
the provisions of section 70 of the Probate Code.
There is no controversy as to the facts. In April, 1949,
the testatrix obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from
CarlL. Duke. One month later, she executed the will, which
has been admitted to probate. By this will she gave the bulk
of her estate to her daughter, I1eah Jamison Herzer, with an
alternative gift to her grandchildren, in the event the daughter should predecease her. Jess 0. Shelby, a grandson, was
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named executor. Her marriage to Logan occurred in May,
1950, and continued until her death in November of 1951.
The will includes the following provision:
''FouRTH: I have, except as otherwise specifically provided in this will, intentionally and with full knowledge,
omitted to provide for my former husband, CARL L. DUKE,
and for any child or children, relatives or heirs who may be
living at the time of my death, ineluding any person or
persons who may, after the date of this will, become my heir
or heirs by reason of marriage or otherwise."
As a conclusion of law from the facts which have been
stated, the court declared that the will showed on its face
the intention of the testatrix to make no provision for Logan
by excluding specifically a class of which he is a member.
In the District Court of Appeal, over the objection of the
appellant, the respondents were permitted to offer additional evidence bearing upon the intent of the testatrix. It
was stipulated that, in lieu of hearing oral testimony, the
affidavits of Leah Jamison Herzer and Jess 0. Shelby might
be considered.
According to those affidavits, Logan and the testatrix were
acquainted for a period of about nine years prior to their
marriage. They visited each other's homes, both before and
after the death of I~ogan 's former wife in February, 1949.
In Jnly of that year, he and the testatrix disclosed to the
affiants their intention to be married as soon as her divorce
became final. Their plans were announced publicly the following month.
Logan takes the position that section 70 of the Probate Code
prohibited the consideration of extrinsic evidence concerning
the intent of the testatrix to make provision for him or to
exclude him from her will. Furthermore, he contends, the
District Court of Appeal erred in permitting the introduction
of additional evidence on appeal. His final argument is that,
even if the extrinsic evidence properly may be considered, the
will cannot be construed as showing an intention of the testatrix not to provide for him.
Section 70 of the Probate Code provides: ''If a person
marries after making a will, and the spouse survives the
maker, the will is revoked as to the spouse, unless provision
has been made for the spouse by marriage contract, or unless
the spouse is provided for in the will, or in such way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to make such pro-
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vision ; and no other evidence to rebut the presumption of
revocation can be received.''
[1] The policy of law which underlies this section has
been declared to be the social disfavor toward a testator's
failure to provide for a surviving spouse. (Sanders v. Sirncich, 65 Cal. 50, 52 [2 P. 741] ; Rundell v. McDonald, 41 Cal.
App. 175, 181 [182 P. 450].) [2] As the court said in the
Sanders case, " [ t] he law presumes that the subsequent marriage of a testator has wrought such a change in his condition
in life as to cause him to destroy or cancel a previous will ; and
does not admit of evidence to the c<mtrary unless provision has
been made according to law for wife and children who have
survived him." (P. 52.)
[3] At common law, a revocation of a will because of a
subsequent change in domestic relations of a testator was
based upon his implied intention. (See Estate of Meyer,
44 Cal.App. 289, 291 [186 P. 393]; 1 Page on Wills [Lifetime
eel.], § 507 et seq. ; Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills
[1937], § 166, pp. 400-404.) [4] In California, the doctrine
of implied revocation has been replaced by a statutory presumption of revocation which operates upon the showing that
the spouse married the testator after the making of the will
and survived the maker. (In re Comassi, 107 Cal. 1, 4 [40
P. 15,28 L.R.A. 414]; Estate of Meyer. supra, p. 291.) These
things being shown, the will is revoked as to the spouse,
regardless of what may have been the wishes of the deceased
unless the testamentary document includes: (1) provision for
the spouse by marriage contract; (2) provision for the spouse
in the will; or (3) mention of the spouse therein in such way
as to show an intention not to make such provision. (Prob.
Code, § 70; Corker v. Corker, 87 Cal. 643, 648 [25 P. 922] ;
Estate of Turney, 101 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [226 P.2d 80).)
There is no contention that Logan was provided for by a
marriage contract or in the will. The respondents contend
that, by the disinheriting clause of the will, Logan was "in
such way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to
make such provision." In reply, Logan takes the position
that the clause is of the most general nature and cannot be
construed as indicating an intention to exclude an afteracquired husband.
Considering the word ''mention,'' as used in this section,
this court said in Estate of Kurtz, 190 Cal. 146 [210 P. 959]:
"No reason is perceived why the wife could not be 'mentioned'
by any description that would include her. Certainly it would
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not be necessary to mention her by name and to include her,
as she was included, in the description of a class, 'mentions'
her as effectually as if she had been named therein.'' ( P. 149.)
Later cases, construing somewhat similar exclusionary
clauses, have tended to restrict the broad rule stated in the
Kurtz decision. An apparent basis for this tendency is the
recognition that to permit avoidance of revocation of a will
by such generally worded exclusionary clauses as are commonly used for other purposes may subvert the statutory
purpose.
[5] Where a will has been executed prior to the marriage,
it is probably the unusual case in which a person does so
intending either to provide for or to exclude a future spouse.
And, although a testator need not make provision for such
a spouse, he is required to bear in mind the possibility of a
subsequent marriage and the serious changes in domestic
relations resulting therefrom. The Supreme Court of Georgia
said of a similar statute : ''The object of the provision is to
secure a specific moral influence upon the testamentary actthe moral influence of having in mind a contingent event so
momentous as marriage . . . , and so deserving of consideration in framing a testamentary scheme." (Ellis v. Darden, 86
Ga. 368, 372 [12 S.E. 652, 653, 11 L.R.A. 51] ; quoted with
approval in Estate of JJ1eyer, supra, p. 292.)
[6] Accordingly, although broad enough to include a
spouse, exclusionary clauses which fail to indicate that the
testator contemplated the possibility of a later marriage have
been held to be insufficient to avoid a revocation of the will.
(Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d 761 [147 P.2d 1] [exclusion
of "all my heirs who are not specifically mentioned herein"] ;
Estate of Rozen-Goldenberg, 1 Cal.App.2d 631 [37 P.2d 132]
[exclusion of heirs living at the time of testatrix' demise] ;
Estate of Turney, supra [omission of "my heirs living at the
time of my demise"]; cf. Estate of Ryan, 191 Cal. 307, 311
[216 P. 366] [naming future spouse executrix held insufficient
to indicate "that decedent contemplated matrimony" at the
time the will was drawn].)
A further inquiry, and one which is decisive in this case,
is whether to be sufficient such a clause must show that the
testator contemplated marriage to a specific person. This
question has not been considered in California but a statute
almost identical in wording to Probate Code, section 70, was
construed in In re Hall's Estate, 159 Wash. 236 [292 P. 401].
41 C.2d-17
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There the will provided: ''I hereby direct that in the event
that I should remarry that said marriage shall in no wise
alter or affect the disposition of my property but that . . . my
separate property shall be distributed in the manner hereinbefore set forth . . . . " It was further provided that a surviving spouse should receive only the community property.
Although recognizing that the clause did not show that
the testatrix had in mind marriage to a particular person, the
court held that the clause was sufficient to avoid a revocation
of the will. "The words 'my husband' spoken in the future
tense are as specific as words commonly used to describe
after-born children, and it is a common practice to make provision in wills for any after-born child, which practice we
. . . have upheld." (292 P. 403.) In practice, a testator may
have good grounds for preferring that his will stand despite
any future marriage, and no sound reason is suggested why he
may not express his intention by a clause referring to a future
spouse in general terms. The Hall case is persuasive authority
for permitting a testator to do so.
[7] In the will presently under consideration, the testatrix has excluded "any person or persons who may, after
the date of this will, become my heir or heirs by reason of
marriage or otherwise." (Emphasis added.) By this provision she clearly stated an intention not to provide for a
class of persons which necessarily would include a future
spouse. In addition, she declared that the classification includes any person who may thereafter become her heir ''by
reason of marriage,'' a phrase which must necessarily refer to
her future marriage, if it is to be given legal significance.
Under such circumstances, the will mentioned a future spouse
in such way as to show an intention not to provide for him.
A substantial portion of the briefs of both parties has been
devoted to argument concerning the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence to establish the testatrix' intention. This evidence
was admitted on the authority of Estate of Kttrtz, supra.
In that case, the testator disinherited "each and all persons
whatsoever claiming to be, and who may be, my heirs at law,
except as such may be determined by this will, and if any
of such parties or such heirs, or any person whomsoever who,
if I died intestate, would be entitled to any part of my estate,
shall [attack the will], I hereby give . . . to said person One
($1.00) Dollar . . . . " The probate court refused to receive
extrinsic evidence showing that the will was executed on the
day prior to the decedent's marriage. Upon appeal, the re-
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jection of such evidence was held to be erroneous. "It was
admissible for the purpose of showing who the maker of the
will intended to include by the phrase 'any person whomsoever who, if I died intestate, would be entitled to any part
of my estate,' a phrase which, if he had not been then engaged
to marry the contestant, would be somewhat ambiguous, but
which would be made certain by showing the fact of such engagement. Evidence is always admissible to show extrinsic
facts which serve to explain the meaning of ambiguous words
appearing on the face of a will, and this evidence was admissible for that purpose." (P. 149.)
Logan argues that the Kurtz case was overruled by Estate
of Ryan, supra, and Estate of Axcelrocl, supra. However,
neither of these decisions disapproved the Kurtz case, although in Estate of Axcelrocl the court expressly withheld
approval of that portion of the opinion which sanctioned the
taking of extrinsic evidence. In both the Ryan and Axcelrod
cases the court was confronted with testamentary language
differing from that considered in Estate of Kurtz, and it
very properly distinguished the latter decision upon that basis.
[8] Although the Kurtz decision correctly holds that extrinsic evidence may be received to resolve an ambiguity
resulting from uncertain language appearing in a will (Prob.
Code, § 105; Estate of Kearns, 36 Cal.2d 531, 537 [225 P.2d
218] ) , the application of the rule to the will involved in that
case is questionable. Such words as "heirs at law," "intestate,'' and the like, rather tl1an presenting an ambig-uity
concerning whether a testator had in mind the possibility of
a future marriage, are merely noncommittal upon the issue.
They serve to indicate neither the presence nor absence of
such a mental state, and to remedy such omission by resort to
extrinsic evidence would be contrary to the express terms of
Probate Code, section 70. ( Cf. Estate of Ryan, supra, p. 310;
Estate of Garra~~d, 35 Cal. 336, 341-342.)
In the present case, no uncertainty appears in the terms
of the will by which a future spouse is excluded. Accordingly,
extrinsic evidence concerning the testatrix' intention in this
regard should not have been received. [9] However, because
such evidence merely tended to support the correct legal conclusion of the trial court concerning the effect of the will, no
prejudice resulted to either party.
[10] Logan also appealed from the order denying his
motion to vacate the judgment. As no appeal lies from such
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an order, the latter appeal must be dismissed. (Prob. Code,
§ 1240; see Estate of Winslow, 128 Cal. 311, 312 [60 P. 931] ;
cf. In re Walkedy, 94 Cal. 352, 353 [29 P. 719]; In re Seymour, 15 Cal.App. 287, 288-290 [114 P. 1023] .)
The judgment is affirmed and the purported appeal from
the order is dismissed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I reiterate the views expressed in my concurring opmwn
in Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d 761, 769 [147 P.2d 1]. The
,vords in the will in the Axcelrod case which are held not
sufficient to escape the revocatory effect of marriage after
execution of the will were that the testator intentionally
omitted all "heirs" not mentioned in the will and expressly
disinherited them. In the present case the only words in addition to "heirs" are "heirs by reason of marriage or otherwise." That is not sufficient as the word "heirs" alone would
include an heir by marriage as well as by consanguinity and
the use of "heirs" alone is not a sufficient mentioning under
the Axcelrod case to disinherit a spouse married after the
execution of a will. Estate of Kurtz, 190 Cal. 146 [210 P. 959]
is to the contrary but that case, although distinguished in the
Axcelrod case, was in effect overruled thereby. (See discuRsion 82 Cal.L.Rev. 213.)
The statute (Prob. Code, § 70) provides that if a person is
married after the execution of the will, the will is revoked as
to the after acquired spouse unless the spouse is in such ·way
"mentioned" therein as to show an intention not to make
provision for him or her. The latest general definition of
''mentioned'' is: ''As a verb, 'mention' is definert in \11[ ebster's New International Dictionary, 2d edition (1943), as
'To make mention of; to refer to . . . casually; to specify,
esp. by name; to name,' and as a noun the word is employed
to indicate 'a speaking or notice, esp. in a brief or cursory manner; a specification, usually by name; casual introduction into
speech or writing; naming, esp. incidentally.' '' (Hunt v.
Mayor & Council of Riverside, 31 Cal.2d 619, 626 [191 P.2d
426].) Specifically applied to section 70, various factors must
be considered in determining the sufficiency of the words of
mention to escape revocation. Having in mind the words
used in Estate of Axcelrod, supra, 23 Cal.2d 761, the court
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there said: ''A person who was then a stranger, both in consanguinity and affinity, and whose subsequent relationship
was yet to be projected, could scarcely have been considered
by the testatrix as an 'heir,' much less, a surviving husband.
She said in her will, 'I have intentionally omitted all of my
heirs who are not specifically mentioned herein, ·intending
thereby to disinherit them . . . ' (Italics added.) Insofar as
the operation of section 70 of the Probate Code is concerned
her intention is to be determined only as of the date of the
execution of the instrument. (See Estate of Carter (1942),
49 Cal.App.2d 251, 254 [121 P.2d 540] .) A man does not
'omit' the name of his child from a document if he has no
child; a woman does not 'omit' her h1lsband from her will
if she has no husband in fact or in contemplation . . . .
"Mere general phraseology such as that which is employed
in the will now before us cannot be construed to mention the
appellant-a subsequently acquired husband-' in such way
. . . as to show an intention not to make' provision for him.
He is not mentioned at all. The only word used which could
possibly include him is the word 'heirs.' But at the time the
will was executed the testatrix had no husband who could
become an 'heir.' If she was at that time contemplating
marrying anyone it may have been someone other than appellant. The will does not mention appellant by name or by
contemplated relationship or otherwise in any way by which
he can be identified as a particular person who was in her mind
at that time. Since it does not identify him by name or by
eontemplated relationship, or designate a classification which
slwws on its face that it necessarily was then the intention
of the testatrix to include therein a subsequently to be acquired
husband, it cannot be held that such a subsequently acquired
husband has been mentioned . . . .
" 'It would appear that the intention [if any] to make
no provision for the future surviving spouse would have teJ
be set out with greater certainty and explicitness than in the
instant case if the revocation provided by section 70 of the
Probate Code is to be averted, where, as here, there is no
marriage contract and no provision for such survivor in the
will.'" (Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d 761, 767 [147 P.2d 1];
emphasis added.) In Estate of T~trney, 101 Cal.App.2c1 720
[226 P.2d 80], the words used by the testatrix were that she
had omitted to provide for "my heirs living at the time of my
dernise." They were held insufficient to disinherit an after
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acquired spouse, the court stating: ''A party seeking to rebut
the statutory presumption of revocation must bring himself
within the literal terms of one of the exceptions. (See Corker
v. Corker, 87 Cal. 643 [25 P. 922] ; Estate of Smith, 15 Cal.
App.2d 548 [59 P.2d 854] .) " (Estate of Turney, 101 Cal.App.
2d 720, 722 [226 P.2d 80]; emphasis added.)
To the same effect are Estate of Rozen-Goldenberg, 1 Cal.
App.2d 631 [37 P.2d 132], and Estate of Ryan, 191 Cal. 307
[216 P. 366].
From the foregoing it is and should be the rule that there
is not sufficient mention of the after acquired spouse to prevent revocation unless, on the face of the will, the prospective
spouse is named or if designated by a general term it appears
that the testator or testatrix contemplated marriage. This
gives meaning and effect to section 70 and prevents its evasion
by general words which do not indicate any real intention to
disinherit an after acquired spouse because the question was
never really given concrete consideration by the testator or
testatrix.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent.
In my view the policy and the express law of this state as
enunciated in section 70 of the Probate Code, and as upheld
by this court in Estate of Axcelrod (1944), 23 Cal.2d 761,
767-768 [147 P.2d 1], disclose the complete untenability of
the majority's discussion and conclusion.
In accord with section 70 and Estate of Axcelrod I would
reverse the judgment.

